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to affect the terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater
obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in payment
of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of
property without due process of law.' u2 5 The analogy to the Seligman
case is quite clear. If the Seligman court's intent was to ignore the
provision absolving the insurer from liability in Seider-type cases, the
effect would be to impose a greater obligation than the insurer had
agreed to assume. Home Insurance requires the state to show some
interest in the case before it can do this.
As the Seligman case demonstrates, the Seider doctrine has a
boundless propensity for creating new problems.

26

To ameliorate this

situation, a recent legislative proposal would replace Seider with a
direct action statute. 12 7 A right of action would be created against

automobile liability insurers doing business or qualified to do business
in New York. The action would be maintainable against the insurer
regardless of any contrary provision in the policy but only in cases
involving out-of-state automobile accidents where no basis of personal
jurisdiction over the insured is present. The proposed statute would bar
all attachment of liability policies. While an action under this statute
might involve the voiding of provisions in out-of-state contracts, its
limitation to automobile cases makes it less objectionable than the
Seider doctrine which could conceivably have a wider application. More
importantly, the direct action statute would avoid the quasi-in-rem
nature of the proceeding, 128 thus eliminating the troublesome question
of determining the value of the attached res. Hopefully, this proposal
will soon become the law.
CPLR 5240: Court indicates that relief from a completed sale of real
property will be difficult to obtain.
Too often the sale of a judgment debtor's home pursuant to CPLR
5236 results in a miscarriage of justice. 1 29 In many cases, a substantial
125 Id. at 408.

126 Seider's difficulties have inspired much critical comment. See, e.g., La Brum, The
Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54 A.BA.J. 747,
751 (1968); Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many Or Putting Seider Back Into Its
Bottle, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 660, 687 (1971); Stein, Jurisdiction By Attachment of Liability
Insurance, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 1075 (1968); 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary
at 14-72 (1973).
127 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORE, REPORT TO ThE 1973 LEGISLATURE
IN

FELATION TO THE CIVIL PRACriCE LAW AND RULES, PROPOSALS RELATING TO A RiIGHT OF

204650 (1973). This proposal was passed by the 1973 Legislature but was vetoed by the Governor.
128 Professor David D. Siegel notes that most of the problems of the Seider doctrine
arise from its quasi in rem mold. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary at 51-52
(1973).
129 In 1963, both the right of redemption and the requirement that personal property
DIRECT AcTION AGAINST LIABILITY INSURANCE CARRIERS, MCKINNEY'S N.Y. SESSION LAws
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equity is sold for a small fraction of its market value while the judgment is left unsatisfied. 30 CPLR 5240, which gives the court broad
equitable powers to supervise the enforcement procedures of article
52 of the CPLR, 13 ' seems fully adequate to protect the debtor from
abuse if prompt application is made to the court before the commencement of an execution sale.' 32 The real problem is that the victims of
be levied upon before real property were abolished. Possibly as a consequence of this
change, a group of professional judgment collectors has arisen who buy judgments at a
fraction of their value from reputable creditors for the purpose of levying upon the home
of the debtor and buying it at a fraction of its true value. For excellent discussions of this

development see Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 699, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1971) (Lynde, J.); 7B McKMNNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 161

(1969). The Appellate Division, Second Department, had an opportunity to correct some
of the present abuses in Concord Landscapers, Inc. v. Pincus, 41 App. Div. 2d 759, 341
N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1973), but instead deferred to the Legislature. The court therein

held that section 489 of the Judiciary Law does not prohibit the purchase of judgments for
the purpose of execution and levy upon the real property of debtors pursuant to CPLR
5236 by professional judgment collectors. For a criticism of this decision see The Quarterly
Survey, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 159, 185 (1973).
130 A case in point is Morgan v. Maher, 60 Misc. 2d 642, 303 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1969), wherein a bidder at an execution sale brought an article 78 proceeding to compel a sheriff to accept a bid of $174.43 for an interest in real property of undisclosed value. The sheriff had refused to honor the bid and had returned the execution
unsatisfied. The court held that the sheriff had exceeded his authority since he had no
knowledge of the property's value. The effect of the decision was to wipe out the debtor's
equity while leaving a $4,386.89 judgment unsatisfied. The sheriff explained his actions as
follows:
Several of the other bidders, although they did not bid, were those involved in
situations in the past where a low bid took away an interest in real property worth
thousands of dollars. The Sheriff, taking into consideration the extremely low bid
made, and the fact that no other executions had been filed against the real property on sale, thereupon used his discretion in refusing to accept the one bid made,
which in his estimation was too low.
Respondent's Memorandum of Law at 6. The suggestion of collusion among bidders provides one possible explanation for the low sales prices received at these sales.
131 CPLR 5240 reads in pertinent part:
The court may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any interested
person, and upon such notice as it may require, make an order denying, limiting,
conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the use of any enforcement
procedure....
132 The courts appear quite willing to prevent or postpone a CPLR 5236 sale to
avoid injustice. A typical instance where relief under CPLR 5240 has been granted has
been where creditors have sought to levy and execute upon an estranged husband's interest
in a family residence held as a tenancy by the entirety. See Seyfarth v. Bi-County Elec.
Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 363, 341 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973); Hammond v.
Econo-Car of the N. Shore, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 546, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 580, 603 (1973); Gilchrest
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 Sr. JoHN's L. REv. 355, 378 (1971). In each
case, the court restrained the sale to prevent hardship to the debtor's wife and family.
The courts reasoned that the proceeds of such a sale were certain to be small due to the
peculiar and uncertain nature of the interest levied upon. Compare Lover v. Fennell, 14
Misc. 2d 874, 179 N.YS.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1958) (dictum) (purchaser of
husband's one-half interest in a tenancy by the entirety at an execution sale has the right
to be put into possession with the wife), with Berlin v. Herbert, 48 Misc. 2d 393, 265 N.Y.S.
2d 25 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1965) (wife is entitled to occupy the whole property to the
exclusion of the purchaser of the husband's interest). The only real value to the creditor
of an immediate sale in such a case is to pressure the wife into paying a debt which was
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unjust execution sales frequently fail to retain counsel in time to
3
invoke the statute's protection.8
A recent case, Murphy v. Grid Realty Corp.,18 4 illustrates this
problem in vivid detail. Judgments were docketed against a debtor's
interest in a family residence owned by him and his wife as tenants
by the entirety. The debtor deeded his interest, subject to the judgment
liens, to his wife. Subsequently the couple was divorced. A judgment
creditor levied and executed upon the one-half interest in the home
to which his lien had attached. The wife was advised by a sheriff's
notice that she could avoid the sale by paying $920.74. Instead of paying
this sum, she bid $1,000 at the execution sale but lost to another bidder
who purchased the interest for $2,336. The value of the interest was
conceded to be $7,657.135 When the successful bidder sought to partition the property, the wife commenced a special proceeding in the
Supreme Court, Nassau County, seeking to have the court vacate the
execution sale pursuant to its powers under CPLR 5240. In her verified
petition she stated that she first became aware of any liens on the property when a collection agency called her demanding payment of a
judgment of $654.05. She claimed that she later discovered that judgments totaling $4,500 were docketed against the one-half interest in the
property formerly owned by her ex-husband. She further stated that
when she received notice that the interest deeded to her by her ex-husband was to be executed upon, she mistakenly believed that she could
buy the levying creditor's judgment at the sale. She claimed that she
bid all the money she could raise and retained an attorney only after
losing the property to another bidder.136 The court, however, refused
not hers, something she may ill-afford to do, or to compel her to sell the house to pay the
judgment, something the court is justifiably reluctant to force her to do.
In other cases, courts have adopted judicial sales even though the debtors themselves
resided in the homes levied upon. Emphasizing the hardship that results from loss of a
residence, the courts in three such cases vacated executions on the condition that the
debtor pay off the debt in installments. See Shapiro v. DeLeonardes, 170 N.Y.L.J. 97, Nov.
20, 1973, at 20, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County); Holmes v. W.T. Grant, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d
486, 336 NY.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (two adults and four children on
public assistance); Dime Say. Bank v. Barnes, 67 Misc, Rd 837, 325 NY.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 768, 791
(1972) (mortgage foreclosure - seventy-eight-year-old woman in ill health).
183 "Seeing to it that these matters are brought to the court's attention, and setting up
a statutory scheme to that end, would seem the most fertile ground of legislative correction
of these abuses." 7B McKrNNFY's CPLR 5236, supp, commentary at 164 (1969). Professor
David D. Siegel recommends that the court or a derk of the court be required to hold a
conference with a judgment debtor before his residence is sold to inform him of the impending sale and to determine whether some form of relief under CPLR 5240 is appropriate.
Id. at 163.
134 73 Misc. 2d 1071, 343 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
135 Petitioner's Petition at 11; conceded in Respondent's Petition at 2.
136 Petitioner's Petition.
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to consider her explanation1 37 and denied the relief sought on the
ground that she could have avoided her plight by paying the judgment
before the sale. 188 While purporting not to express any opinion on the
scope of the powers granted by CPLR 5240, the court gratuitously
opined that:
If it were the intention of the Legislature that the Court should be
empowered to vacate a proper execution sale for equitable reasons,
it should have made an explicit provision to that effect in the statute and should have provided for a time limit with respect to an
application for such relief as it did with respect to CPLR § 2003.13)
It seems clear that had the petitioner in Murphy sought relief pursuant to CPLR 5240 before the execution sale, she would have been
successful. In a strikingly similar case, Koshar v. Koshar, 40 a wife,
threatened with the imminent sale at execution of an ex-husband's
former interest in a family residence, made a pre-sale application to a
court for relief under CPLR 5240. The court enjoined the sheriff's sale,
emphasizing that the wife was not the debtor and that there had been
no showing of any attempt to enforce the judgment against the husband. The court granted the creditor leave to later execute on the
family residence upon i showing of a change of circumstances. In similar cases, where timely application was made under CPLR 5240, courts
have avoided the drastic consequences of a sheriff's sale by ordering
payment of judgments in installments. 41 Professor David D. Siegel has
suggested that even if a sale cannot be postponed, a judgment debtor
137 The court did allude to the possibility that the petitioner might actually have been
attempting to wipe out the liens of other judgments docketed against the property at a
price less than that which would be required to pay them off. 73 Misc. 2d at 1072, 343
N.Y.S.2d at 671. This appears unlikely, however. At the time of the sale, only $1500 worth
of executions had been delivered to the sheriff. Since the conceded value of the equity sold
was $7,657, it would have been well worthwhile for the petitioner to have bid in excess of
$1500. Once the price was bid above $1500, the petitioner could bid as high as she desired
at no extra cost because the excess above this amount would revert to her. The fact that
she failed to bid any higher than $1000 indicates that she either did not understand the
situation or, as she claimed, simply could not raise sufficient money to dear the property.
138The court stated that "[hier failure to make that payment does not justify the

requested interference by the Court with an enforcement procedure which is not claimed

to have been conducted except in full compliance with the requirements of CPLR article
52." 73 Misc. 2d 1071, 543 N.YS.2d 670, 671 (emphasis added). Contrast with this the following statement by the United States Supreme Court in 1886:

It is insisted that the proceedings were all conducted according to the forms of
law. Very likely. Some of the most atrocious frauds are committed in that way.
Indeed, the greater the fraud intended, the more particular the parties to it often
are to proceed according to the strictest forms of law.
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180 (1886).
139 73 Misc. 2d at 1071, 343 N.YS.2d at 672.
140 170 N.Y.LJ. 25, Aug. 6, 1973, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County).
141

See cases cited supra note 132.
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should at least be able to persuade a court to modify the sale-procedure
to ensure a fair price.14 2
The rigid approach adopted by the Murphy court with respect to
relief from a completed execution sale does not appear to be justified
either by the intent underlying GPLR 5240143 or by case law. Courts of
equity have long been willing to set aside judicial sales when the price
was inadequate or when there was evidence of mistake, inadvertence,
ignorance, or a suspicion of unfairness. 44 A price so low as to shock the
conscience of the court has in itself,, and absent any other factors warranting relief, been considered sufficient to justify judicial intervention.145 Unfortunately, the Murphy court's refusal to consider these
possible factors indicates that relief will be much more difficult to
obtain after the sale is completed than before.
Clearly legislative action to remedy abuses of the execution sale
procedure is in order. When the Legislature abolished the right of
redemption in 1963,146 its intent was to increase purchase prices at exe142 Professor Siegel has recommended that courts entertain "a kind of 5228-5240 motion, combining a request for a protective order staying the execution as a remedy and
asking instead for the appointment of a receiver to sell the property." 7B McKlNNEY's
CPLR 5240, supp. commentary at 182 (1973). Presently, the language of CPLR 5228 would
allow only the creditor to get such an appointment, but the broad powers given by CPLR
5240 to regulate, extend, or modify the use of any enforcement procedure appear sufficient
to permit an appointment for the debtor's benefit.
143 The rule is stated as broadly as possible and is designed to replace the diverse, overlapping, overly technical and inconsistent provisions relating to the
manner in which enforcement procedures may be modified, vacated, and regulated.
TIRiD REP. 314.
144 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Federer, 315 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1958) (arrangement between
bidders to purchase at less than the fair market value); King v. Platt, 37 N.Y. 155 (1867)
(circumstances gave rise to a suspicion that free competition was interfered with); Zouppas
v. Yannikidou, 16 App. Div. 2d 52, 225 N.YS.2d 557 (Ist Dep't 1962) (partition sale set
aside where price was inadequate and terms of the sale were indefinite and contrary to
the judgment); Wright v. Caprarella, 205 App. Div. 559, 199 N.Y.S. 864 (2d Dep't 1923)
(property worth $5000, purchased for $1900, and mortgagor failed to appear at the sale on
time through the negligence of his attorney); Commercial Bank v. Catto, 13 App. Div. 608,
43 N.Y.S. 777 (4th Dep't 1897) (sale set aside because price inadequate); Goldberg v. Feltman's of Coney Island, Inc., 205 Misc. 858, 130 N.Y.S.2d 728 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954)
(sale set aside because price inadequate). See also Colonial Steel Corp. v. Piquin, Inc., 74
Misc. 2d 273, 344 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1978) (suspicious sale of
personalty set aside).
145 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 4416 (1984) (dictum);
Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285 (1907); Hawkins v. Snellings, 255 Ala. 659, 53 So. 2d 552
(1951) (price less than one-half the amount of the original loan on the mortgage); Schaeffer
v. Moore, 262 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1953) (purchased for 4.7% of the reasonable market value
at sheriff's sale); Fisher v. Hersey, 78 N.Y. 887 (1879); Holness v. McGillian, 161 N.Y.LJ. 6,
Jan. 9, 1969, at 19, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1969) (property purchased by
creditor for one-sixtieth of its fair market value at the sheriff's sale); Alben Affiliates v.
Astoria Terminal, Inc., 34 Misc. 2d 246, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962)
(property worth $350-400,000, purchased by mortgagee for $24,000 -but the true cost to
the mortgagee was the value of the mortgage, $286,000).
146 CPLR 5286 replaced most of the elaborate provisions for the sale and redemption
of real property contained in CPA 708-755.
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cution sales, thus benefiting both creditors and debtors. 147 This benefit
could be insured by amending CPLR 5236 to provide for greater court
supervision. 1 48 Until the Legislature acts, courts should not hesitate to
fashion remedies even after the sale when circumstances warrant relief.
ARTICLE 75-ARBITRATION

CPLR 7501: Court of Appeals adopts separability approach where a
broad arbitrationclause is present.
New York has required that the issue of fraud in the inducement
of a contract containing an arbitration clause be determined by the
court and not the arbitrators. The law stems from a 1957 decision of
the Court of Appeals in Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick. 49 Implicit in
the Court's decision was the assumption that arbitration clauses were not
separable from the principal contract; therefore, if the contract were
tainted with fraud, the entire contract was invalid, including the arbitration clause. 5 0 The application of this approach affected the nature
of the remedy sought: if the party's complaint prayed for damages
under the contract, he was said to have ratified the contract rendering
the arbitration clause therein enforceable; only if the party elected to
151
rescind the contract could he avoid arbitration.
147 See generally 6 WK&-M
5236.02. One rationale for the abolition of the right of
redemption is that the purchaser at an execution sale will pay more for an absolute title
than for a title which is subject to redemption. As one authority has noted, however,
redemptive rights do have certain advantages.
The utility of these statutes [allowing redemption] arises out of the fact that the
most frequent customer at a foreclosure sale is the mortgagee himself, being thereby
the purchaser from whom redemption is to be made. . . . These statutes offer a
strong inducement to the mortgagee to bid a price commensurate with the value
of the land.
SA P. POWELL, TnE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 470 (P. Rohan ed. 1973).
Just as the mortgagee is frequently the purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the judgment
creditor is often the buyer at execution sales. When the creditor buys property at less
than its market value, he receives a windfall unless the full fair market value of the property is credited against his judgment. While the CPLR makes no express provision for
this, one New York court has held that CPLR 5240 gives the court power to grant such
a credit. See Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 75 Misc. 2d 32, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 159, 188
(1973); cf. RPAPL § 1371.
148 See note 133 supra.
149 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957) (4-3).
150Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin -What
Does It Mean? 43 ST. JonN's L.
REv. 1, 10-11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Aksen]. The traditional view is espoused by Professor Corbin: "It would seem that if the alleged defect exists, it effects the provision for
arbitration just as much as it affects the other provisions." 6A A. CORBiN, Co'TRAcrs § 1444
at 449 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CoRBiN].
251 Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotaick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 19, 143 N.E.2d 366, 367, 163 N.Y.S.2d
639, 640 (1957).
Where an action for rescission is brought to recover the benefits conferred by the
wronged party as a result of the transaction, and the court exercises its equitable powers to
avoid the contract ab initio, there is no difficulty in reasoning that "[i]f there has never

